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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
This civil forfeiture proceeding stems from the 
government's seizure of $21,460.00 and $10,700.00 in 
United States currency from claimants Allan Johnson and 
Jermaine Thomas, respectively, after they were stopped for 
a traffic violation while driving on Interstate 295 outside of 
Wilmington, Delaware. Claimants appeal the District 
Court's determination that the government's seizure of the 
currency did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and its 
conclusion that the government met its burden of 
establishing probable cause to institute forfeiture 
proceedings against the currency pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 
S 881(a)(6) (1999). Because we agree with the claimants' 
position that the government failed to establish that it had 
probable cause to commence forfeiture proceedings, we will 
reverse the District Court's Decree of Forfeiture entered on 
April 28, 2000, and remand the matter with directions that 
the District Court enter judgment in favor of the claimants. 
Given our disposition, we need not, and will not, address 
claimants' Fourth Amendment challenge to the seizure of 
the currency. 
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I. FACTS and PROCEEDINGS 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
The outcome of this appeal depends upon the legal 
significance we ascribe to the facts surrounding the 
forfeiture of the currency, and we are constrained in this 
respect by the government's agreement to stipulate to a 
bare record of agreed facts, which we fully set forth here. At 
10:12 a.m. on April 29, 1998, Officer McManus of the 
Delaware River and Bay Authority ("DRBA") stopped a 
rented Ford Taurus for traveling 60 miles per hour in a 50 
mile per hour zone. The vehicle was occupied by three 
individuals: Antonio Whitfield, the driver; claimant 
Jermaine Thomas, who was located in the front passenger 
seat; and claimant Allan Johnson, who was in the back 
seat. All three occupants exited the vehicle and provided 
identification indicating that they were from Wilmington, 
North Carolina. Whitfield also provided the rental car 
agreement which listed the lawful driver as Thomas, despite 
the fact that Whitfield was driving when McManus stopped 
the car. 
 
McManus's police report indicated that she questioned 
each occupant individually concerning the group's travel 
plans. Whitfield told McManus that they were going 
shopping, but that he was not sure where. McManus also 
noted that Whitfield's hands were shaking and that he 
avoided making eye contact with her. Thomas and Johnson 
told McManus that they were going to northern New Jersey 
to visit family. McManus observed that Thomas also 
avoided making eye contact with her. 
 
McManus obtained consent to search the vehicle. During 
a check of the interior, she noticed a strong odor of air 
freshener, but did not find any weapons or contraband. 
Upon searching the trunk, McManus found two bags-- a 
black duffel and a blue backpack. She also noticed two 
cellular telephones and cologne. Johnson claimed 
ownership of the blue backpack and consented to 
McManus examining its contents. McManus opened the 
blue backpack and found clothes at the top; underneath 
the clothes she discovered a blue plastic bag, and inside 
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the blue plastic bag was another blue plastic bag tied at the 
top. Inside the interior blue plastic bag was an unknown 
amount of United States currency rubber-banded together. 
Johnson claimed ownership of the money, advised that it 
was $21,000, and that the group was en route to buy a car. 
 
Thomas claimed ownership of the black duffel bag and 
also consented to McManus examining its contents. 
McManus searched the bag and found clothing; under the 
plastic liner of the duffel bag, she found a second unknown 
quantity of United States currency that was rubber-banded 
in a similar fashion as the first amount she found. Thomas 
stated that there was $8,000 in the bag. Johnson and 
Thomas confirmed that they did not have receipts for the 
currency. 
 
After completing the search, at approximately 10:30 a.m., 
McManus decided to transport the currency back to the 
DRBA troop for further investigation. She also requested 
that the claimants ride with her back to the DRBA troop, 
which they did. Upon arrival, Thomas and Johnson were 
searched and questioned, but both refused to provide any 
information other than personal data. During the search, 
DRBA officers found $2,950.00 in cash on Thomas's 
person, rubber-banded in a fashion similar to the money 
found in the trunk of the car. They also found $430.00 in 
cash on Johnson's person. At some point thereafter, Officer 
Creighton spoke with Enterprise Rental Car Company and 
discovered that the lease agreement under which the 
vehicle had been rented provided that the vehicle was not 
to be driven north of the Virginia border. Also, at 
approximately 12:30 p.m., Officer Penrod spoke with an 
officer at the Wilmington, North Carolina Police 
Department, who advised him that each of the men lived in 
an area known for high drug activity, and that Johnson 
had murder charges pending against him. At some point 
between 12:05 p.m. and 2:05 p.m., Officer Thompson 
conducted a canine detection test. The record indicates that 
the test "gave positive indications on the currency" but 
offered "negative indications" with respect to the interior 
and exterior of the vehicle. Between 2:00 p.m. and 3:00 
p.m., officers issued two traffic citations to Whitfield and 
transported all three occupants to the Wilmington, 
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Delaware bus station to return home to North Carolina. The 
DRBA kept the currency and the cell phones. Claimants 
were not charged with any illegal activity other than the 
traffic citations. 
 
Between 2:47 p.m. and 3:11 p.m., DRBA Sergeant 
Gaworski vacuumed the automobile and the currency, and 
subjected both to an ION Scan Analysis. The graphs, which 
purportedly show the results of the ION Scan on the items 
in the vehicle, are included in the record. Agent David 
Allegretto of the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") stated in 
an affidavit that the results of this test indicated "that the 
monies showed high levels of cocaine residue, an indication 
that the monies were involved in drug trafficking," A-12, 
but the affidavit does not explain more specifically how he 
arrived at that conclusion by reviewing the graphs provided. 
 
DRBA officers subsequently performed criminal histories 
on all three persons in the vehicle. Whitfield, the driver, 
had no criminal history. Claimant Thomas had been 
convicted of one drug offense -- conspiracy to traffic in 
cocaine on February 7, 1995. Claimant Johnson had been 
convicted of several drug offenses, including (1) possession 
of controlled substances on August 16, 1989, and August 
3, 1992; (2) possession of cocaine on November 12, 1994; 
and (3) possession with intent to sell and distribute 
narcotics on March 14, 1996.1 
 
B. Proceedings in the District Court 
 
Based on the evidence collected in the field and at the 
DRBA troop, the government filed two verified complaints of 
forfeiture in rem against the currency pursuant to 21 
U.S.C. S 881(a)(6).2 The complaints averred that forfeiture 
was justified under the statute because the currency was 
"used or intended to be used to facilitate a drug transaction 
and/or constitutes proceeds traceable to a drug 
transaction." Agent Allegretto of the DEA stated in an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. As noted above, Johnson also had murder charges pending against 
him. 
 
2. The District Court consolidated the two in rem proceedings by order 
dated November 29, 1998. 
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affidavit that, based upon the information learned during 
the stop and subsequent investigation, the government's 
forfeiture was based on the theory that "the subjects were 
on their way to New Jersey to purchase drugs to take back 
to Wilmington, North Carolina for sale." A-13. 
 
After Johnson and Thomas filed claims of ownership of 
the currency, they filed a motion for summary judgment, 
arguing that the currency was seized in violation of their 
Fourth Amendment rights, and that consequently, the 
evidence collected at the DRBA troop could not be used in 
determining if there was probable cause to institute 
forfeiture proceedings. They also claimed that even if the 
government could utilize the "pre-seizure" and"post- 
seizure" evidence, it was insufficient to satisfy its threshold 
burden of establishing probable cause to institute forfeiture 
proceedings. 
 
The District Court entered an order denying claimants' 
motion for summary judgment. First, the Court rejected 
claimants' Fourth Amendment challenge to the seizure, 
finding that McManus had probable cause to detain the 
currency and subject it to further investigation based upon 
the information she had gathered up to that point during 
the encounter with the claimants. In finding probable 
cause, the Court recognized that these facts, "if viewed 
through the lens of a scholarly analysis, are consistent with 
innocent travel," but went on to conclude "that the degree 
of suspicion that attaches to these particular non-criminal 
acts via the experience of this law enforcement officer is 
sufficient to pass probable cause muster." 3 A-21 to -22. 
Second, having found that the seizure was supported by 
probable cause, the Court held "that the government 
carried its burden of proof " in the forfeiture action, because 
the totality of the information was sufficient to establish 
probable cause that the currency was subject to forfeiture 
pursuant to S 881(a)(6). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Despite the District Court's reliance on McManus's experience, we 
were unable to locate evidence anywhere in the record of that experience 
or any training that might inform her evaluation of the criminal nature 
of this admittedly non-criminal activity. 
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After the Court denied claimants' summary judgment 
motion, the parties entered into a "Stipulation for Entry of 
a Decree of Forfeiture," in which claimants reserved their 
right to appeal. The Court entered the Decree of Forfeiture, 
and this appeal followed. 
 
II. JURISDICTION and STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The District Court exercised subject matter jurisdiction 
over the forfeiture action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.SS 1345 
and 1355. United States v. RR # 1, Box 224 , 14 F.3d 864, 
868 (3d Cir. 1994). We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. S 1291, and we review the District Court's 
probable cause determination de novo. E.g., United States v. 
Conley, 4 F.3d 1200, 1204 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. 
$191,910.00 in United States Currency, 16 F.3d 1051, 1071 
n.43 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. $250,000 in United 
States Currency, 808 F.2d 895, 897-98 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
Claimants first contend that the District Court erred in 
finding that the seizure of the currency was lawful under 
the Fourth Amendment because it was supported by 
probable cause. They maintain that the facts within 
McManus's knowledge, up to the point at which she 
informed claimants that she was seizing the currency for 
further investigation, gave rise only to a "reasonable 
suspicion," and not probable cause, to detain the currency. 
Second, claimants urge us to reverse the District Court's 
determination that the government had probable cause to 
institute forfeiture proceedings, a necessary prerequisite 
under S 881(a)(6), claiming that the facts within the 
government's knowledge at the time that it filed the in rem 
complaints were insufficient to establish a nexus between 
the currency and any predicate drug activity by claimants. 
As indicated above, we will decide this appeal on the latter 
basis. 
 
In civil forfeiture cases instituted pursuant toS 881(a)(6), 
S 881(d) mandates that United States customs procedures 
govern the allocation of the parties' burdens of proof. United 
States v. RD 1, Box 1, 952 F.2d 53, 56 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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Accordingly, the procedures found in 19 U.S.C. S 1615 for 
customs forfeitures apply. Id. Section 1615 provides: 
 
       S 1615. Burden of Proof in forfeiture proceedings 
 
        In all suits or actions . . . brought for . . . forfeiture 
       . . ., where the property is claimed by any person, the 
       burden of proof shall lie upon such claimant; Provided, 
       That probable cause shall be first shown for the 
       institution of such suit or action, to be judged . .. by the 
       court. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the government bears the 
initial burden of establishing that it had probable cause to 
believe that the currency was subject to forfeiture at the 
time that it filed the forfeiture complaints in the District 
Court. If the District Court determines that the information 
relied upon by the government is sufficient to establish 
probable cause that the currency may be forfeited, the 
procedure set forth in S 1615 shifts the burden to the 
claimant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that 
he or she has a defense to the forfeiture. E.g. , United States 
v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d 794, 804 (3d Cir. 1994). 
However, if the government has failed to satisfy its initial 
burden of demonstrating probable cause for the forfeiture 
proceeding, the claimants need not come forward with 
evidence to rebut the government's proofs. E.g. , United 
States v. $506,231 in United States Currency, 125 F.3d 442, 
451 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 
Three elements must be present in order to subject a 
claimant's property to civil forfeiture pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 
S 881(a)(6): (1) the subject property must be moneys, 
negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value; 
(2) there must be probable cause to believe that there exists 
illicit drug activity that renders the seized property subject 
to forfeiture; and (3) there must be probable cause to 
believe that a connection, or nexus, exists between the 
seized property and the predicate drug activity the 
government has identified.4See, e.g., RR # 1, Box 224, 14 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In their briefs, claimants contend that the government must establish 
probable cause to believe that a "substantial connection" exists between 
the seized currency and an illicit drug exchange. However, at oral 
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F.3d at 869; see also United States v. $22,474.00 in United 
States Currency, 246 F.3d 1212, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(stating that government must have "reasonable grounds to 
believe that the [money] was related to an illegal drug 
transaction"). Under S 881(a)(6), both the illicit drug activity 
that renders the property subject to forfeiture and the 
currency's connection or nexus to it can be established by 
pointing to credible evidence establishing probable cause to 
believe that the property at issue either: (1) was"furnished 
or intended to be furnished" in exchange for a controlled 
substance; (2) constitutes "proceeds traceable" to a drug 
exchange; or (3) was "used or intended to be used to 
facilitate" a violation of federal drug laws. 21 U.S.C. 
S 881(a)(6);5 e.g., United States v. One Lot of United States 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
argument, claimants' counsel admitted that he was unsure what, if 
anything, the adjective "substantial" added to the probable cause 
analysis. We recognize that some of our sister circuits have described the 
government's initial burden as requiring it to demonstrate a "substantial 
connection," while others have used language such as "nexus" or some 
"connection." Compare, e.g., United States v. $5,000 in United States 
Currency, 40 F.3d 846, 849 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that government 
must establish probable cause to believe there is a"substantial 
connection" between the money and a controlled substance exchange), 
and United States v. $38,600.00 in United States Currency, 784 F.2d 
694, 697 (5th Cir. 1986) (same) with $506,231.00 , 125 F.3d at 451 
("Probable cause for the forfeiture exists if the government demonstrates 
a nexus between the seized property and illegal narcotics activity.") 
(emphasis added), and United States v. One Lot of United States Currency 
($36,634), 103 F.3d 1048, 1053 (1st Cir. 1997) ("[T]he government must 
show that it has probable cause to believe that the property had the 
requisite nexus to a specified illegal purpose.") (emphasis added). While 
we have previously noted in passing that the distinction between 
"substantial connection" and "nexus" or"some connection" "appears to 
be semantical," RD 1, Box 1, 952 F.2d at 58 n.5, we need not decide 
whether the various tests are substantively different. Assuming that the 
government is correct that it need only establish probable cause to 
believe that the money bears a connection or nexus to an illicit drug 
transaction, rather than a "substantial connection," we find that it has 
not met its burden in that regard. 
 
5. The full text of S 881(a)(6) provides: 
 
       The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States 
and 
       no property right shall exist in them: 
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Currency ($36,634), 103 F.3d 1048, 1053 (1st Cir. 1997); 
United States v. $30,060.00 in United States Currency, 39 
F.3d 1039, 1041 (9th Cir. 1994). The government may 
establish probable cause for the existence of the underlying 
drug activities and the currency's nexus to the illicit 
conduct by relying on circumstantial evidence. E.g., United 
States v. $4,225,000.00 in United States Currency , 762 F.2d 
895, 904 (11th Cir. 1985). 
 
In determining whether the government's proofs are 
sufficient to pass the probable cause threshold, we point 
out initially that the facts of this case do not present the 
"typical" forfeiture scenario we have previously addressed 
under S 881(a) in which the claimants' property, real or 
personal, can be linked to a narcotics violation because the 
property was seized as a consequence of a police 
investigation, arrest or conviction for an underlying drug 
crime.6 Moreover, this case is also unusual because the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       (6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things 
of 
       value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in 
       exchange for a controlled substance or listed chemical in violation 
of 
       this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and 
all 
       moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to 
       be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter. 
 
6. We recognize, of course, that forfeiture underS 881(a) is not 
conditioned upon an arrest or conviction for a drug offense. We merely 
point out that the link between an underlying drug crime and the seized 
property certainly is more apparent where the forfeiture is the product of 
an associated drug arrest, conviction or targeted investigation of the 
claimant. E.g., One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d at 802-03 (forfeiture 
followed conviction for RICO violations predicated on identifiable drug 
activities to which car could be linked); RR # 1, Box 224, 14 F.3d at 869 
(finding that government established probable cause to institute 
forfeiture proceedings against real property underS 881(a)(7) where civil 
forfeiture followed defendant's conviction for narcotics offenses, and 
issue was whether government's evidence sufficiently linked premises to 
claimant's cocaine distribution activities); United States v. 717 S. 
Woodward St., 2 F.3d 529, 531-32 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that evidence 
of convicted defendant's drug activities on his properties gave rise to 
probable cause to institute civil forfeiture proceeding against real 
properties under S 881(a)(7); facts concerning defendant's drug activities 
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government has not presented any evidence whatsoever 
from which it could be inferred that claimants were 
involved in any drug exchange at or around the time that 
the government instituted forfeiture proceedings. 7 As a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
on premises were not disputed); RD 1, Box 1, 952 F.2d at 54-55 (stating 
that probable cause to forfeit existed where claimant was convicted of 
drug offenses and civil forfeiture proceeding followed; only question was 
whether real property was sufficiently connected to known drug 
violations so as to subject it to forfeiture underS 881(a)(7)); United 
States 
v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 937 F.2d 98, 101, 104 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating 
that government had probable cause to institute forfeiture proceedings 
against real property under S 881(a)(7), as forfeiture arose out of 
indictment of defendant for narcotics violations, and government 
provided evidence indicating that claimant purchased home with 
proceeds from defendant's narcotics activities that were the subject of 
the indictment), aff 'd, 507 U.S. 111 (1993); United States v. 6109 Grubb 
Rd., 886 F.2d 618, 620 (3d Cir. 1989) (forfeiture proceeding followed 
investigation revealing that the defendant had used the property to 
further drug trafficking, and defendant was convicted for those offenses; 
claimant conceded that government had probable cause to forfeit based 
upon her husband's conviction and information gathered in criminal 
case); United States v. $55,518.05 in United States Currency, 728 F.2d 
192, 196 (3d Cir. 1984) (finding that government had probable cause to 
seize currency under S 881(a)(6) on theory that it was intended to be 
used to purchase drugs because it had been seized in connection with 
claimant's arrest for attempted narcotics purchase); United States v. 
Bush, 647 F.2d 357, 361 (3d Cir. 1981) (civil forfeiture of currency and 
vehicle followed from claimant's conviction for narcotics violations); 
United States v. One 1977 Lincoln Mark V. Coupe, 643 F.2d 154, 156-57 
(3d Cir. 1981) (forfeiture proceeding followed claimants' drug arrest; 
only 
issue was whether car was sufficiently involved in observed drug 
transaction to subject it to forfeiture under "facilitation theory"). 
 
7. We have not overlooked the fact that the Allegretto affidavit alleges 
that, subsequent to the DRBA's seizure of the claimants' currency, 
claimant Johnson was arrested twice for narcotics violations in North 
Carolina. However, the government has not relied upon these allegations 
of subsequent arrests to uphold the District Court's probable cause 
determination, the statement remains uncorroborated in the record, and 
the record does not reveal the ultimate disposition of the charges. 
Moreover, the parties' stipulation of facts filed in the District Court 
did 
not recite the allegation in the Allegretto affidavit on this issue. Given 
the 
government's apparent disregard of the subsequent arrests, and in the 
absence of any information concerning the ultimate disposition of the 
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matter of logic, circumstantial evidence implicating 
claimants in recent drug activities, such as, for example, 
evidence of claimants' contemporaneous affiliation with 
known drug traffickers, or claimants' possession of drugs or 
drug paraphernalia at the time of the seizure, would 
support the government's theory that the money in 
claimants' possession is connected to illegal drug 
trafficking. If presented by the government, such evidence 
would have provided a strong, albeit inferential, present 
link between claimants' currency and the drug trade, and 
would have provided a more compelling case for forfeiture 
under S 881(a)(6). Here, however, the government does not 
dispute that McManus did not find drugs or drug 
paraphernalia in claimants' vehicle, and it does not point to 
any reliable evidence of a similar nature from which it can 
be inferred that claimants were involved in drug activities 
at or around the time the government seized the currency 
and filed the forfeiture complaint.8  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
charges, we attach no significance to Allegretto's statement. Cf., e.g., 
United States v. $215,300 in United States Currency , 882 F.2d 417, 419 
(9th Cir. 1989) (holding that claimant's previous arrest for marijuana 
trafficking was not probative in forfeiture proceeding because it had been 
dismissed). 
 
8. In several cases, other courts of appeals have found that the 
government had probable cause to institute forfeiture proceedings 
against currency where the government presented reliable direct or 
circumstantial evidence of claimants' contemporaneous involvement in 
drug activities. E.g., $36,634, 103 F.3d at 1051, 1054-55 (stating that 
circumstantial evidence was sufficient to show currency's link to drug 
activities where claimant associated with known drug traffickers who 
had been recently arrested for importing marijuana, and claimant 
planned to take identical route as drug traffickers); United States v. 
$149,442.43 in United States Currency, 965 F.2d 868, 876-77 (10th Cir. 
1992) (finding that large amount of hidden currency, presence of drug 
paraphernalia, including packaging supplies and drug notations 
reflecting large drug transactions, established probable cause to forfeit 
currency); United States v. $91,960.00 in United States Currency, 897 
F.2d 1457, 1462-63 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding probable cause to forfeit 
currency because, inter alia, claimant was found with large sum of 
money and a notebook that appeared to be a record of drug transactions, 
and had been convicted of drug crime one year after forfeiture); United 
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We are aware, of course, that the government need not 
link the currency to "a particular identifiable illicit drug 
transaction" among several to forfeit the money on the 
theory that it constitutes drug proceeds. E.g. , United States 
v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 937 F.2d 98, 104 (3d Cir. 1991), 
aff 'd, 507 U.S. 111 (1993); United States v. Carrell, 252 
F.3d 1193, 1200 & n.8 (11th Cir. 2001). Also, the 
government need not produce direct proof of a narcotics 
nexus to meet its burden of establishing probable cause for 
the forfeiture. Nevertheless, the quality of the 
circumstantial evidence that the government does proffer to 
establish probable cause to institute forfeiture proceedings 
must be strong enough to support reasonable grounds for 
belief that an actual, rather than purely theoretical, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
States v. Padilla, 888 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding probable 
cause to forfeit currency where claimant was under police surveillance at 
the time of the forfeiture because he was suspected of engaging in 
narcotics transactions, and police searched associates' homes and found 
drugs; court found that government presented evidence that claimant 
"had recently been involved in a drug transaction"); $215,300, 882 F.2d 
at 419 (finding probable cause, relying upon fact that claimant's airline 
ticket was issued by Miami travel agency that had issued airline tickets 
for 20 to 30 other travelers from whom police had previously seized 
narcotics-related currency); United States v. $5,644,540.00 in United 
States Currency, 799 F.2d 1357, 1363 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that 
probable cause existed based upon, inter alia , presence of cocaine in 
suitcase containing money and circumstantial evidence that claimant 
was connected to motel known as site for drug transactions); United 
States v. 13,000 in United States Currency, 733 F.2d 581, 585 (8th Cir. 
1984) (stating that government had probable cause to forfeit currency 
based upon evidence of drug paraphernalia found on claimant's person 
at time of seizure and fact that, the day before the seizure, claimant 
made phone calls to same apartment in New York that he called just 
prior to his 1981 drug distribution arrest); United States v. $93,685.61 
in United States Currency, 730 F.2d 571, 572 (9th Cir. 1984) (per 
curiam) (finding that government had probable cause to forfeit currency 
when claimant was arrested for drug violation and subsequent search of 
house found currency, drug paraphernalia and drugs); United States v. 
$84,000 in United States Currency, 717 F.2d 1090, 1099-1100 (7th Cir. 
1983) (finding probable cause based on claimants' admissions that they 
intended to purchase drugs in Florida with currency and additional fact 
that police found narcotics with currency). 
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connection exists between the currency in claimants' 
possession and the drug trade. See, e.g., RR # 1, Box 224, 
14 F.3d at 869 (stating that the government must 
"establish some connection between the alleged criminal 
[drug] activity and the defendant property the government 
seeks to forfeit"); see also $36,634.00, 103 F.3d at 1053 
(stating that probable cause for forfeiture means 
"reasonable grounds" for believing that the currency is 
connected to illegal drug activity). In our view, the 
government's proofs, even when considered in the 
aggregate, simply are not strong enough to establish 
probable cause to believe that there had been, or was about 
to be, a violation of the drug laws involving this currency. 
 
Probable cause, as a standard of proof, "is defined as a 
reasonable ground for belief in guilt." United States v. 6109 
Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618, 621 (3d Cir. 1989); see also 92 
Buena Vista Ave., 937 F.2d at 101. Furthermore,"[t]he 
determination of probable cause in a forfeiture proceeding 
simply involves the question whether the information relied 
on by the government is adequate and sufficiently reliable 
to warrant a belief by a reasonable person" that the 
currency is connected to illicit narcotics activities. 6109 
Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d at 621 (citations omitted); accord RR 
#1, Box 224, 14 F.3d at 869 (stating that government can 
meet burden if it establishes "probable cause that the 
property is connected to criminal activity based upon 
information adequate and sufficiently reliable to warrant 
the belief that the property was used to further the 
trafficking of illegal narcotics") (internal quotation marks 
omitted). As stated by the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit, "to pass the point of mere suspicion, 
it is necessary to demonstrate by some credible evidence 
the probability that the money was in fact connected to 
drugs." $30,060.00, 39 F.3d at 1041 (second emphasis 
added) (internal quotation marks omitted). We determine 
whether probable cause exists by reviewing the aggregate 
facts that the government has presented. E.g. , 92 Buena 
Vista Ave., 937 F.2d at 104. 
 
As we previously mentioned, the government's in rem 
complaint alleged, in a rather conclusory fashion, two 
possible connections between claimants' currency and a 
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predicate violation of the drug laws. It claimed that 
claimants intended to use the currency to facilitate a drug 
exchange, or that the currency constituted proceeds 
traceable to such an exchange by claimants at some point 
in the past. Allegretto's affidavit provided a more specific 
(albeit unsupported) hypothesis, namely that the money 
was connected to a drug exchange because the claimants 
were most likely traveling to New Jersey to purchase drugs 
with the currency. 
 
In support of these competing forfeiture theories, the 
government relies on several pieces of evidence, which, in 
its view, demonstrate that it had probable cause to believe 
that the currency was connected to a completed, or 
intended, drug exchange. It points to the seemingly large 
amount of cash found in the claimants' bags and the 
manner of storage of the currency (rubber-banded in 
bundles and concealed in bag), and also the claimants' 
prior drug convictions. It also relies on the canine's positive 
reaction to the currency and the results of the ION Scan 
Analysis. Finally, it cites the claimants' alleged residence in 
a high drug activity area in Wilmington, North Carolina, 
claimants' allegedly suspicious conduct during McManus's 
questioning, their violation of the rental car agreement, 
their possession of cellular phones, cologne and air 
freshener in the vehicle, and McManus's statement 
characterizing I-295 as having a volume of drug trafficking. 
 
In reviewing the sufficiency of the government's 
information, we " `review each piece of evidence only to 
determine whether it is probative, not whether it 
establishes probable cause standing alone.' " United States 
v. 255 Broadway, 9 F.3d 1000, 1004 (1st Cir. 1993) 
(quoting United States v. $67,220.00 in United States 
Currency, 957 F.2d 280, 285 (6th Cir. 1992)). And because 
there are " `many variables in the probable cause 
equation,' " each case necessarily turns on its own unique 
facts. Id. (quoting United States v. Maguire, 918 F.2d 254, 
258 (1st Cir. 1990)). 
 
First, we recognize that the evidence concerning the 
claimants' allegedly "suspicious" and nervous behavior 
during the traffic stop can be considered in determining 
whether the government had probable cause to forfeit 
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claimants' currency. E.g., United States v. $129,727.00 in 
United States Currency, 129 F.3d 486, 490 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(noting that claimant was "nervous and shaking as he 
spoke to officers"). However, claimants' apparent 
nervousness is of minimal probative value, given that 
many, if not most, individuals can become nervous or 
agitated when detained by police officers. E.g., United States 
v. One Lot of United States Currency ($14,665), 33 F. 
Supp.2d 47, 55 (D. Mass. 1998) (noting that claimant's 
nervousness during interaction with law enforcement 
officers "is not an unreasonable response, regardless of the 
source and intended use of the currency"). 
 
Moreover, claimants' allegedly "suspicious" behavior 
during the stop and their violation of the rental car 
agreement are not particularly probative factors because, at 
best, they suggest involvement in some unspecified furtive 
activity; they do not indicate, more specifically, that 
claimants had engaged, or were about to engage, in a drug 
sale with this currency. E.g., United States v. $5,000 in 
United States Currency, 40 F.3d 846, 850 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(stating that claimant's evasive explanation of purpose of 
trip provided, at best, "inchoate and unparticularized 
suspicion") (internal quotation marks omitted); 
$191,910.00, 16 F.3d at 1072 (observing that discrepancies 
in claimant's story raised "a suspicion that[he] was 
involved in illegal activities, but not probable cause"). In 
this regard, we further point out that claimants' 
"suspicious" actions consisted mostly of providing 
inconsistent answers concerning the destination and 
purpose of their trip, but the discrepancies cited by the 
government are not great. For example, claimants Johnson 
and Thomas indicated that they were traveling to New 
Jersey to visit family, while the driver, Whitfield, stated that 
they were going shopping but was not sure of their ultimate 
destination. When McManus discovered the currency, 
Johnson indicated that they were en route to purchase a 
car, but that explanation is not irreconcilable with their 
previous response that they were traveling to New Jersey to 
visit family, or were going shopping. In any event, to the 
extent that the claimants' somewhat inconsistent answers 
might be suggestive of possible involvement in some 
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criminal activity, we do not view the inconsistencies as a 
strong indication of a narcotics nexus. 
 
Similarly, claimants' travel on Interstate 295, which 
Officer McManus's report characterizes as having"some 
volume" of drug trafficking, A-77, is a factor to be 
considered in evaluating the totality of the circumstances. 
See, e.g., $22,474.00, 246 F.3d at 1216 (noting that travel 
route to Phoenix, a known drug source city, is probative of 
probable cause to forfeit currency). Here, however, 
claimants' travel route is a minor consideration in the 
overall probable cause analysis, as travel on I-295 through 
Delaware is not an occurrence so "out of the ordinary" as 
to be even marginally suggestive of claimants' present 
involvement in the drug trade.9See, e.g., United States v. 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1989) (noting that innocent 
behavior may provide a basis for reasonable suspicion, but 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. While the government also relied on the presence of cologne, cellular 
telephones and air freshener in the vehicle as indicators of a valid 
narcotics nexus, we do not view these factors as probative on this issue. 
Aside from the general allegation in the Allegretto affidavit that all of 
the 
facts and circumstances indicated to him that the currency was drug- 
related, A-7, the government has not presented any evidence that 
addresses the more specific issue of whether the presence of these 
objects is indicative of involvement in the drug trade. In the absence of 
a record basis for concluding that these factors are indicative of drug- 
related activity, we will ascribe no significance to the presence of these 
items in evaluating whether the government had probable cause to 
institute the forfeiture. See, e.g., 30,060.00, 39 F.3d at 1044 (rejecting 
government's argument that drug dealers carry money in wrapped 
bundles and its statement that the amount involved was consistent with 
the cost of two kilograms of cocaine because "it provide[d] no authority 
for these contentions, which are, in any event, speculative"); cf. 
$129,727.00, 129 F.3d at 488-89 (finding probable cause to forfeit, 
crediting testimony by DEA agent with eight years' experience that many 
of claimants' actions were consistent with drug courier profile). In any 
event, were we to consider this information, the degree of probative value 
we would attach to it is minimal, as the presence of these objects is not 
"out of the ordinary" in the sense that few persons would possess these 
items while traveling. See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 
(1989) (stating that defendant's cash purchase of two airline tickets was 
probative because that conduct was "out of the ordinary, and it [was] 
even more out of the ordinary to pay that sum from a roll of $20 bills 
containing nearly twice that amount of cash"). 
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that it depends on the degree of suspicion that attaches to 
particular noncriminal acts); Reid v. Georgia , 448 U.S. 438, 
441 (1980) ("The other circumstances describe a very large 
category of presumably innocent travelers, who would be 
subject to virtually random seizures were the Court to 
conclude that as little foundation as there was in this case 
could justify a seizure."); see also $30,060.00, 39 F.3d at 
1045 (distinguishing previous cases upholding forfeiture of 
currency where claimants had traveled on an airplane to or 
from a drug source city, stating that claimant was merely 
"driving a car when he ran a stop sign"). 
 
Moreover, the record contains no evidence in support of 
McManus's bald assertion that I-295 has "some volume" of 
drug activity and no proffer of her experience or training 
that might lend credibility to that assertion. Lacking a basis 
for this proposition, such as some recitation of her 
experience or training and how that experience or training 
supports her conclusion, we cannot credit the fact that the 
claimants were using a major interstate to be probative of 
drug trafficking. See Rivera v. Murphy, 979 F.2d 259, 264 
(1st Cir. 1992) (noting that conclusions drawn from the 
experience and training of a police officer must be 
"sufficiently conveyed" so as to be understood by the 
average reasonably prudent person before they can support 
probable cause). We also point out that claimants' travel 
route was consistent with what they told McManus they 
intended to do -- travel from North Carolina to northern 
New Jersey to visit family and/or purchase a car-- which 
further mitigates the probative value of their travel on I- 
295. See, e.g., $36,634, 103 F.3d at 1055 (stating that 
claimant's assertion that he was traveling to Las Vegas to 
gamble and look for a pizza shop to purchase "made no 
sense in light of the fact that his ticket provided only a 
brief, middle-of-the-night layover in that Nevada city"). 
 
The government also points to the fact that the DRBA 
officer received information from the Wilmington, North 
Carolina Police Department that claimants resided in a 
section of Wilmington characterized as a "high drug area." 
However, this statement is not probative of whether the 
money in claimants' possession was drug-related because, 
unlike evidence linking claimants' actual place of residence 
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to known previous narcotics activities, e.g., United States v. 
$5,644,540.00 in United States Currency, 799 F.2d 1357, 
1363 (9th Cir. 1986) (suspect's address was motel known 
as a site for drug transactions), or information concerning 
claimants' known association with accused drug traffickers, 
e.g., $36,634, 103 F.3d at 1054 (claimant associated with 
recently arrested, known drug traffickers), the fact that 
claimants reside in a neighborhood that local law 
enforcement officers identified as a high drug activity area 
does not "meaningfully relate" to any specific conduct by 
these claimants that could be viewed as indicative of a 
narcotics nexus, id. at 1055 n.9. Rather, the officer's 
statement is a general observation that could apply equally 
to many other innocent individuals who have engaged in no 
criminal wrongdoing, let alone a violation of the drug laws. 
We also think it is significant that the police officer's 
hearsay statement concerning claimants' neighborhood 
lacked any further explication and remains uncorroborated 
in the record, both of which weigh against a finding that 
the statement is probative of the currency's connection to 
narcotics. See, e.g., $506,231, 125 F.3d at 452 & n.7 
(discounting hearsay statement in IRS agent's affidavit 
concerning a narcotics delivery to claimants' premises 
because, although it is permissible to rely on hearsay to 
establish probable cause to forfeit, it did not"believe that 
this hearsay [was] particularly reliable"); $67,220.00, 957 
F.2d at 286 (discounting DEA agent's statement that he 
had "reason to believe that [claimant] sold cocaine" because 
agent "refused to offer any basis for his belief that 
[claimant] had sold drugs"). 
 
The government relies heavily on the remaining factors -- 
the positive dog sniff, the results of the ION Scan Analysis, 
the claimants' previous convictions, and the large amount 
of currency and manner of packaging (rubber-banded in 
large bundles) -- as establishing probable cause to believe 
that the money is linked to a consummated or 
contemplated drug transaction. Its substantial reliance on 
these pieces of circumstantial evidence is understandable 
given that they are the factors that point most directly to a 
contemporaneous connection between the currency and 
potential illegal narcotics activities by claimants. However, 
upon closer examination, these factors do not carry the 
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evidentiary significance that the government ascribes to 
them. 
 
First, we attach no significance to the evidence derived 
from the post-seizure dog sniff. While we recognize that we 
have previously, on occasion, accepted proof of a positive 
canine alert as probative in other contexts,10 we have not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. For example, in United States v. Massac , 867 F.2d 174, 176 (3d Cir. 
1989), we upheld the defendant's warrantless arrest, concluding that the 
government had probable cause to arrest based upon an informant's tip 
that the defendant and her companion acted suspiciously in booking the 
trip from Florida, the companion's suspicious conduct upon arrival in 
Wilmington, Delaware, and the trained dog's positive reaction to the 
defendant's luggage at the train station. We found the dog sniff evidence 
was probative because "of the fact that trained dogs can detect the 
presence of concealed narcotics with almost unerring accuracy and the 
finding of the district court that this particular dog met the training 
and 
reliability requirements." Id. Subsequently, in United States v. Carr, 25 
F.3d 1194 (3d Cir. 1994), we affirmed the defendant's conviction for 
conspiracy to launder money from a specified unlawful activity -- the 
felonious sale and distribution of drugs -- based in part on evidence that 
a trained dog alerted to the money at issue. Id.  at 1202-03. Over Chief 
Judge Becker's dissent, we found that the positive alert to the money 
found in the defendant's residence was but "only one piece of evidence" 
tending to prove the defendant's guilt and involvement in the conspiracy, 
and that the cumulative weight of all of the evidence was sufficient to 
support the conviction. In a footnote, we specifically rejected the 
argument that the dog sniff evidence had no probative value because of 
the circumstance that a large portion of the nation's currency is tainted 
with drugs. Id. at 1202 n.3. This position, however, is not without its 
detractors. E.g., id. at 1216-17 (Becker J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) ("I am inclined to the view that the information now 
available establishes a strong presumption against the admissibility of 
evidence of a canine's alert to currency, and that the government can 
rebut that presumption only if it first clearly and convincingly 
establishes outside the presence of the jury, the relevance and non- 
prejudicial character of the offered evidence."); United States v. Frost, 
999 F.2d 737, 745 (3d Cir. 1993) (Pollak, J., concurring) (noting that 
defendant's contention that probable cause to search could not be based 
upon result of a positive canine alert was "not .. . frivolous," but that 
he waived the argument by not making it in the district court). In any 
event, our analysis in Carr is consistent with the result we reach here 
because in Carr, we specifically referred to the fact that it was the 
results 
of a "trained" dog alert that were admitted in the district court. Carr, 
25 
F.3d at 1203. 
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yet considered the extent to which a positive canine alert on 
a bundle of money is probative in assessing the 
 653<!>government's probable cause to forfeit that currency 
 
pursuant to S 881(a)(6) based on its connection to drug 
trafficking. We note, however, that several of our sister 
circuits recently have called into question the evidentiary 
significance of a positive reaction to currency in 
determining whether there is probable cause to forfeit the 
money in light of studies indicating that a large percentage 
of United States currency is contaminated with sufficient 
traces of drug residue to cause a canine to "alert" to it. E.g., 
$506,231, 125 F.3d at 453 ("[W]e are unwilling to take 
seriously the evidence of the post-seizure dog sniff. . . . 
Even the government admits that no one can place much 
stock in the results of dog sniffs . . . ."); $5,000, 40 F.3d at 
849 ("We likewise find the evidentiary value of the . . . dog 
sniff minimal."); $30,060.00, 39 F.3d at 1043 (finding that 
probative value of a dog's positive alert in Los Angeles "is 
significantly diminished" because of the evidence of 
widespread contamination in that geographical area, and 
stating that reliance on such evidence to separate 
"legitimate currency from drug-connected currency is 
logically indefensible") (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
Nevertheless, for our purposes, we need not determine, 
as a general matter, the evidentiary weight that should be 
given to a positive dog reaction to seized currency. We agree 
with claimants' position that, on the facts of this case, the 
government's evidence of the dog's positive alert to the 
currency is not probative of whether the money can be 
connected to a drug exchange, because the government has 
not presented any evidence concerning this particular dog's 
past training and its degree of accuracy in detecting 
narcotics on currency. Therefore, we have no record basis 
for concluding that this evidence bolsters the government's 
case. See United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1203 (3d Cir. 
1994) (accepting proof of positive alert by "trained" canine 
as evidence tending to support conviction); United States v. 
Massac, 867 F.2d 174, 176 (3d Cir. 1989) (concluding that 
the positive canine alert on defendant's luggage gave police 
probable cause to arrest, relying in part on District Court's 
conclusion that canine "met the training and reliability 
requirements"); $67,220.00, 957 F.2d at 285-86 (stating 
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that, as a general principle, a positive dog reaction is 
"strong evidence" of drugs, but that, on the record, it was 
probative but "weak" consideration because there was "no 
indication in the record as to the trustworthiness of this 
particular dog"; court ultimately upheld forfeiture based on 
strength of other evidence); see also $22,474.00 , 246 F.3d 
at 1216 (accepting evidence of positive dog sniff as 
probative of whether money was connected to illicit drug 
trafficking where evidence confirmed that dog would not 
alert to cocaine residue found on currency in general 
circulation); United States v. $215,300 in United States 
Currency, 882 F.2d 417, 419 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that 
government had probable cause to forfeit where government 
relied on, inter alia, "uncontradicted trial testimony 
establish[ing] that the particular police dog had an 
unblemished record for detecting narcotics"). Thus, even 
were we to assume that, on a sufficiently developed record, 
a dog sniff could carry some probative value in determining 
whether the currency is connected to a drug crime, the 
positive alert in this case does not rise to the level of 
credible evidence tending to link this currency to narcotics 
activities by claimants. 
 
We reach the same conclusion with respect to the 
evidentiary significance of the results from the ION Scan 
Analysis on the currency and the car. The government 
simply has not produced evidence concerning the reliability 
of this particular testing process or the training and 
qualifications of the tester, two factors which, of course, 
bear on the reliability and accuracy of the results. Instead, 
the parties' stipulation of facts merely incorporates the test 
results without providing any explanation of how the test 
measures the levels of narcotics on the currency, what the 
test results showed with respect to the levels and types of 
narcotics detected, and why those results were scientifically 
significant when compared to the results on other parts of 
the vehicle, or for that matter, when compared to"the 
norm."11 Also, the parties' stipulation does not provide any 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Our review of the test results indicates that for each area of the 
vehicle that was vacuumed and subject to analysis, the test results were 
plotted on a separate graph. The two graphs that reported the testing on 
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indication that the test itself was administered properly so 
as to ensure reliability of the results. The only evidence we 
do have in the record are the actual test results plotted on 
graphs, A-28 to A-33, a report from the individual who 
administered the scan explaining the logistics of how he 
conducted the test, i.e., testing each item separately, A-81 
to -82, and a cursory explanation in the Allegretto affidavit 
that the test "showed high levels of cocaine residue" on the 
currency. A-6. But the documents the government has 
provided in the record do not provide sufficient information 
to guide us in evaluating the evidentiary significance of the 
test results, even though it is the government that bears 
the initial burden of establishing that it had probable cause 
to initiate the forfeiture proceeding. 
 
Thus, the government has left us to our own devices to 
decipher the meaning of the test results and evaluate their 
evidentiary significance in establishing probable cause to 
forfeit the currency. Given the circumstances, we simply 
cannot accept the government's conclusory statement that 
the test results show claimants' involvement in"significant 
drug activity." We conclude that the lack of credible 
information in the record concerning the ION Scan Analysis 
compels the conclusion that the results cannot be 
considered a factor weighing in the government's favor in 
the overall probable cause analysis. Cf., e.g. , Rivera, 979 
F.2d at 264 (noting that officer's training and experience 
are factors to consider in determining probable cause, but 
observing that the "relevance [of such experience and 
training] in a particular case must be sufficiently conveyed 
so that . . . it can be understood by the average reasonably 
prudent person") (internal quotation marks omitted); 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the currency and the trunk are marked "ALARM," and there appears to 
be a higher level of cocaine indicated on each graph as compared to 
other substances indicated. However, we also note that on these graphs, 
the test recorded an increased (but less significant) presence of a 
substance marked "Cal," but we have no explanation as to what "Cal" 
represents. The government has given us little context in which to 
evaluate the test results; we simply do not know from the record what 
the peaks mean, how the test works, and why we should accord the 
results any evidentiary significance. 
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$67,220.00, 957 F.2d at 286 (stating that positive dog 
reaction was "weak evidence" in the probable cause 
equation because the government failed to establish 
reliability of the dog; court noted that it had to consider 
"the relative strengths and weaknesses of the evidence"); 2 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure S 3.2(c) (3d ed. 1996) 
(noting that "[u]nder the probable cause standard, it must 
`be possible to explain and justify [the seizure] to an 
objective third party,' and this is not accomplished by a 
general claim of expertise"). 
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the government 
points to the large amount of cash, the manner in which 
the currency was transported, and claimants' prior 
convictions as the strongest evidence in its favor. It 
contends that the presence of a large sum of cash in a 
vehicle occupied by individuals previously convicted of drug 
offenses provides the requisite connection between 
claimants' currency and illegal drug activities. 
 
While these factors admittedly might cause one to 
suspect that claimants may have been involved, or about to 
engage, in drug activities with this money, are they enough, 
when considered with the other suspicious circumstances, 
to give rise to the reasonable belief that such was the case? 
We think not. We recognize that the amount of money in 
claimants' possession and the method of packaging 
constitute probative circumstantial evidence that the 
currency itself is connected to illicit narcotics transactions. 
E.g., United States v. $149,442.43 in United States 
Currency, 965 F.2d 868, 877 (10th Cir. 1992); $67,220.00, 
957 F.2d at 285. However, given the circumstances 
presented here, we do not view these factors as particularly 
probative of a narcotics nexus. For one thing, the amount 
of money in claimants' possession is consistent on its face 
with their statement that they intended to purchase a car, 
a factor that weighs in their favor in evaluating the totality 
of the circumstances. See $22,474.00, 246 F.3d at 1214 
(affirming probable cause determination where, inter alia, 
claimant indicated that he was en route to purchasing two 
vehicles but the amount of money he possessed was 
insufficient to cover both transactions). Also, it is 
significant that claimants did not lie about the amount of 
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cash they possessed when Officer McManus questioned 
them, and they immediately claimed ownership of the 
money after they voluntarily consented to the search of 
their bags. Both of those considerations weigh in claimants' 
favor in the probable cause calculus. See, e.g. , $67,220.00, 
957 F.2d at 286 (holding that government had probable 
cause to forfeit based upon fact that claimant twice 
understated amount of cash he was carrying); $215,300, 
882 F.2d at 418-19 (finding probable cause to forfeit where, 
inter alia, claimant lied about amount of money he 
possessed, stating he had only $15,000, where search 
revealed additional $201,000 in his socks and apron); 
$83,310.78, 851 F.2d at 1235 (probable cause found where 
police found $125,410 in cash in claimant's home, 
individual attempted to hide cash, and everyone present 
consistently denied ownership of money); United States v. 
$40,000 in United States Currency, 999 F. Supp. 234, 237 
(D.P.R. 1998) (finding that government failed to establish 
probable cause based upon, inter alia , the fact that 
claimant informed police officer of the quantity of cash that 
he was carrying and made no attempt to lie about the 
amount). Thus, while the possession of a large sum of 
money can, in some cases, be viewed as indicative of 
claimants' involvement in drug transactions, given the 
totality of circumstances concerning the currency, we do 
not find their possession of the cash at issue here as 
strongly suggestive of a narcotics nexus. In fact, on 
balance, this factor appears rather neutral. 
 
As for the manner of packaging--rubber-banded in large 
bundles and concealed in baggage--the government has not 
presented evidence that this method of storage is unique to 
the drug trade.12 See, e.g. , $30,060.00, 39 F.3d at 1044 
(rejecting government's contention that drug dealers carry 
their money in wrapped bundles and that the amount of 
money was consistent with the cost of two kilograms of 
cocaine, stating that the government "provides no authority 
for these contentions which are, in any case, speculative"); 
see also $129,727.00, 129 F.3d at 491 (finding probable 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. The government also points out that the money found in Johnson's 
bag was double-bagged in plastic, but there is no evidence in the record 
that narcotics-related currency is generally transported in this fashion. 
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cause to forfeit where government received informer's tip 
that led DEA to claimant, claimant fit drug courier profile, 
and carried $115,000 in cash; court stated that key factor 
was DEA agent's testimony that many drug couriers wrap 
drugs or drug money in fabric softener sheets and plastic 
wrap in an attempt to avoid detection of traces of narcotics 
by drug sniffing dogs). Moreover, we agree with the 
observation by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit that "[t]here is little significance in the fact 
that [claimants' money] was concealed," as"[f]ew people 
carry money, especially large sums, in any way other than 
`concealed.' " $36,634, 103 F.3d at 1055 n.8. Thus, the 
government has failed to provide evidence in the record that 
would support the conclusion that the manner in which the 
currency was packaged weighs in the government's favor. 
 
Finally, the government points to the prior convictions as 
supplying the requisite proof that claimants' currency could 
be linked to drug activity. We recognize, of course, that 
evidence of a prior drug conviction is probative of probable 
cause to forfeit currency in the claimant's possession under 
S 881(a)(6), e.g., $22,474.00, 246 F.3d at 1217; $83,310.78, 
851 F.2d at 1236, just as a defendant's criminal record 
may be considered a probative factor in evaluating probable 
cause in the Fourth Amendment context, e.g., Conley, 4 
F.3d at 1207; United States v. Frost, 999 F.2d 737, 744 (3d 
Cir. 1993). However, here, the prior convictions do not 
provide an adequate link between claimants' currency and 
illicit narcotics activities so as to establish probable cause 
for the forfeiture. 
 
To be sure, claimants' prior convictions demonstrate that 
claimants could be linked to the narcotics trade in the past, 
and in that sense, their criminal record is probative 
because it might give rise to a reasonable suspicion or 
"hunch" that the currency in their possession was drug- 
related. But in our view, without additional credible 
evidence linking claimants, and thus, their currency, to 
drugs, claimants' prior convictions do not provide a 
sufficient temporal link to the drug trade to support the 
forfeiture of claimants' currency. This result is appropriate 
where, as here, claimants were not charged with narcotics 
violations based on the events that led to the forfeiture, 
 
                                26 
  
there is no credible evidence in the record that links 
claimants to any current drug activities,13 and the 
remaining evidence is not specific enough to the drug trade 
to provide the requisite connection or "hook" to narcotics. 
E.g., $5,000, 40 F.3d at 849-50 (finding that government 
lacked probable cause to forfeit currency, and discounting 
claimant's prior drug conviction, stating "the fact that 
[claimant] pleaded guilty to state drug charges more than 
six years earlier is of little import here: a man's debt to 
society cannot be of infinite duration"). 
 
In sum, we have considered the probative force of the 
credible evidence in its totality, and we cannot agree that 
the government has satisfied its burden of establishing that 
it had reasonable grounds to believe that the claimants had 
committed, or were about to commit, a predicate violation 
of the drug laws, and that the currency was "connected" to 
that drug activity. While some of the factors upon which the 
government relies arguably are suspicious and suggestive of 
involvement in some illicit activity, and might even support 
a "hunch" that the money somehow was connected to the 
drug trade, they do not rise to the level of establishing 
probable cause to institute forfeiture proceedings under 
S 881(a)(6). Rather, to establish probable cause in this 
context, the evidence must be sufficient to link the 
currency, via the claimants' actions, to the illegal drug 
trade in a manner that would support a reasonable belief 
that the money is, in essence, "drug money." See, e.g., 
$30,060.00, 39 F.3d at 1044 (finding that"suspicions of 
general criminality are not enough" and observing that 
there was no credible evidence connecting claimant's money 
to drugs; court noted that claimant " `could just as easily 
have been a distributor of street money in a political 
campaign, an embezzler, a jewel smuggler, an art thief, or 
an S&L crook as a drug conspirator' ") (quoting $191,910, 
16 F.3d at 1072) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, 
the credible evidence the government relies upon simply is 
too weak, both qualitatively and quantitatively, to support 
the District Court's determination that the money was, in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. See generally note 8, supra (listing cases in which government 
presented circumstantial evidence of recent connection to or involvement 
with drugs to establish probable cause to forfeit currency). 
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fact, drug-related. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 
(1990) ("Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is 
dependent upon both the content of information possessed 
by the police and its degree of reliability. Both factors -- 
quantity and quality -- are considered in the`totality of the 
circumstances . . . .' "); $30,060.00, 39 F.3d at 1041 
(relevant inquiry is whether credible evidence establishes 
the probability that money was "in fact" connected to drugs) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). In such circumstances, 
we agree with the following observation by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit: 
 
       Nothing ties this money to any narcotics activities that 
       the government knew about or charged, or to any 
       crime that was occurring when the government 
       attempted to seize the money. . . . We reiterate that the 
       government may not seize money, even a half a million 
       dollars, based on its bare assumption that most people 
       do not have huge sums of money lying about, and if 
       they do, they must be involved in narcotics trafficking 
       or some other sinister activity. Moreover, the 
       government may not require explanations for the 
       existence of large quantities of money absent its ability 
       to establish a valid narcotics nexus. 
 
$506,231, 125 F.3d at 453-54 (emphasis added). 
 
Under S 881(a)(6), the government must present sufficient 
facts to warrant a reasonable belief that the seized property 
was connected to illicit drug activities. We conclude that 
the government has failed to meet its burden in this case. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will REVERSE the District 
Court's Decree of Forfeiture entered on April 28, 2000, and 
will REMAND the matter with directions that the District 
Court enter judgment in favor of the claimants. 
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BRIGHT, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 
I write separately to add emphasis that, in this case, this 
court calls a halt to a government's attempt under the 
forfeiture statute to take someone else's money based on 
chimerical or flimsy evidence or even pretext. I 
wholeheartedly join in Judge Rendell's opinion. 
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